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Abstract 
After the Japanese Financial Crisis in 1990s, the non-performing loan problem was mitigated 
in the large Japanese banks but persisted in the regional banking system. By 2004, regional 
banks accounted for half of all non-performing loans. In 2004, the government passed the 
Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF)4, legislation for capital injections to address 
the non-performing loan problem. Aimed at regional banks, the ASFF secured ¥2 trillion in 
capital, with various eligibility restrictions and requirements, such as a rigorous debt 
restructuring plan.  As the Japanese economy and the financial system encountered multiple 
external shocks, the government amended the Act several times. Following the shocks, 
including the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the Great East Earthquake in 2011, Brexit in 
2016, the COVID-19 outbreak of 2020, and the COVID-19 recession in 2021, the government 
expanded the ASFF’s scale, extended end dates, and relaxed eligibility and debt restructuring 
requirements. The ASFF—originally established to recover the capital adequacy ratios for 
banks—eventually turned into a macroprudential tool through amendments that made the 
application more accommodative (Sakaguchi 2020, 3). In total, by the end of September 
2020, over 30 financial institutions applied and received ¥684.04 billion in capital injections 
in the form of preferred shares, subordinated loans and debt, preferred investments, and 
trust beneficiary rights. ¥200.5 billion in capital has been recovered to date (DICJ 2020a, 62–
63).              
Keywords: capital injection, Japan, Asian Financial Crisis, Resolution and Collection 
Corporation, Financial Functions Enhancement Examination Committee 
  
 
1 This  case  study  is  part  of  the  Yale  Program  on  Financial  Stability  (YPFS)  selection  of  New  Bagehot  
Project modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to broad-based capital 
injection programs.   
Cases  are  available  from  the Journal  of  Financial  Crises at  https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 
2 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management. 
3 Research Associate, YPFS, Yale School of Management. 
4 The Act on Strengthening Financial Functions is also referred to in Japanese financial crisis literature and 
government documents as Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Function, or Financial 
Functions Strengthening Act, and written as 金融機能強化法 (Kinyuukinoukyokahou) in Japanese.  
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At a Glance  
Following the Japanese financial crisis in 
the late 1990s, the Japanese government 
introduced a number of crisis-fighting 
tools and adopted restructuring 
frameworks. In 2002, the disposal of bad 
loans became a priority for the Japanese 
government under Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi (Koizumi 2002). 
Former chair of the Financial 
Reconstruction Committee Hakuo 
Yanagisawa had chaired the Japanese 
Financial Services Agency (JFSA) until that 
point but was dismissed because of lack of 
progress in resolving the non-performing 
loan (NPL) problem. Yanagisawa was 
replaced by Heizo Takenaka, who 
enforced what came to be known as the 
Takenaka Plan, one of the most 
controversial financial policies adopted in 
Japan (Himino 2021). While the details of 
the Takenaka Plan did not differ 
significantly from the previous plan, it was 
characterized by stricter enforcement of 
restructuring policies (Hoshi and Ito 
2004). Under Takenaka, many big banks 
improved their capital ratios and stock 
prices increased (Hoshi and Kashyap 
2010; Himino 2021).   
However, while large city banks improved 
their capital ratios, regional banks lagged 
in disposing of nonperforming loans (IMF 
2004). Regional banks were exempted 
from the  government policy requiring a 
halving of the NPL ratio (Koizumi 2002). 
As of March 2003, Barclays estimated 
regional banks accounted for 54 percent of system-wide NPLs, amounting to ¥23.8 trillion. 
By January 2004, the Japanese government determined regional banks to be a priority for 
financial stability (Hirano 2004). 
In January 2004, in response to the burgeoning NPL problem within the regional banks, the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet submitted the Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) to 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose:  “In an environment where financial 
institutions had difficulty in securing financing on their 
own, provide sufficient funding through capital 
participation via public fund injection so that the 
financial sector can voluntarily commit to risk taking 
and function as financial intermediaries in the regional 
economy” (Endo 2013).  
Announcement Date   June 14, 2004  
Operational Date August 1, 2004  
Injection Start Date September 2006  
End of Application 
Window 
March 2026 (after the 
amendment in June 2020) 
Program Size Originally ¥2 trillion, now 
expanded to ¥15 trillion 
after the amendment in 
June 2020  
Eligibility Banks and designated 
nonbanks 
Administrator The Deposit Insurance 
Corporation of Japan 
(DICJ) 
Resolution and Collection 
Corporation of Japan (RCC, 
the subsidiary of the DICJ) 
Legal Authority Passed through the 
Japanese Diet, executed by 
the Prime Minister’s Office  
Key Features SME lending focus  
Merger and acquisitions 
focus (after May 2021 
amendment)  
Multiple amendments with 
end date extensions, size 
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the Japanese Diet, earmarking ¥2 trillion for public capital injections into regional banks 
(House of Representatives, Japan 2004). FSA Chair Heizo Tanaka commented that regional 
banks would be inspected as strictly as national banks under previous public capital 
injections (Hirano 2004). The bill was discussed between January and June, and on June 14, 
2004, the Japanese Diet passed the bill, two days before the end of the 159th Diet Session 
(House of Representatives, Japan 2004). The amount, price, capital characteristics, and the 
timing of the capital injection under the ASFF varied across financial institutions, tailored to 
each institution’s needs.  
Following the original legislation in 2004, the government made a series of amendments to 
the legislation to utilize the capital injection framework for various purposes. 
First, in September 2008, the collapse of Lehman Brothers created the impetus to pass 
legislation to support the Japanese economy. Then Prime Minister Aso announced the 
Comprehensive Immediate Policy Package to Ease Public Anxiety (Aso 2008). The package 
focused on improving small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing, with a series of 
policy measures intended to improve economic well-being with several fiscal targets (Endo 
2013). Under these measures, the Diet passed the first amendment to the ASFF, relaxing 
some eligibility and debt restructuring requirements, extending the sunset date from the end 
of March 2008 to March 2012, and expanding the size from ¥2 trillion to ¥12 trillion (FSA 
2008).   
Second, in March 2011, an earthquake of unprecedented scale—9.0 in magnitude—struck 
the northern coast of Japan. Immediately following, the Prime Minister’s office added line 
items to the supplementary budget for disaster relief efforts (Noda 2011). Four months later, 
the Diet passed an amendment to the existing recapitalization legislation with special clauses 
for regional institutions supporting the revitalization of areas affected by the earthquake and 
extended the sunset date to the end of the March 2017 (House of Representatives, Japan 
2011; Endo 2013). 
Third, in 2016, Japan held the presidency of the G7 countries. During this presidency, the UK 
public voted to leave the EU. To show leadership, the Japanese government led the G7 in 
preparing for potential financial stability implications resulting from Brexit. The government 
proposed another amendment to the act to prepare for the risks arising from Brexit by 
continuing to support the growth of SMEs; this time the government amended the sunset 
date to the end of March 2022. The amended bill passed the diet on December 2, 2016 (Abe 
2016; House of Representatives, Japan 2016).   
Fourth, in 2020, upon the outbreak of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the Japanese Diet 
passed another amendment to the ASFF. On June 13, the Diet extended the period of public 
capital injections to financial institutions for an additional four years, to the end of 2026. The 
amended bill also proposed the expansion of the available public funds for the injection from 
¥12 trillion to ¥15 trillion (House of Representatives, Japan 2020). In proposing the new 
amendment, Taro Aso, the Minister of State for Financial Services emphasized that the 
domestic financial system was sound and that the amendment was a preemptive measure 
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ensuring the long-run soundness of the financial system so that it could continue to support 
SMEs impacted by the COVID-19 crisis and revitalize the economy (Aso 2020). 
The fifth and most recent amendment to the ASFF was passed by the Diet on March 5, 2021 
and was implemented on May 19, 2021. The Japanese Diet explained that the purpose of the 
amendment was to maintain financial functions that support the recovery and revitalization 
of regional economies (rural areas) in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Citing 
declining populations in those regional areas, regional banks that plan to merge or acquire 
other banks may submit "implementation plans” to receive capital injections (FSA 2021). 
The declining population and its negative impact on regional economies and the financial 
system have long been a concern for Japan. For instance, the Bank of Japan’s April 2017 
Financial System Report raised concerns about declining profitability of financial 
institutions, noting that the consequences of a declining population and other macro factors 
could lead to potential vulnerabilities (Bank of Japan 2017). In November 2020, the Bank of 
Japan also introduced the “Special Deposit Facility to Enhance the Resilience of the Regional 
Financial System,” a program to promote cost savings, mergers, and other acquisitions 
within regional banks (Bank of Japan 2020). 
Figure 1 below summarizes the evolution of ASFF and participation data.  
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Notes: Data as of June 2021, and participation and injection data as of September 2020.  
Source: Sakaguchi 2020; FSA 2021; 2008; 2011b; House of Representatives, Japan 2004; 2011; 2020.  
Summary Evaluation 
Though the program became operational on August 1, 2004, it remained unutilized until two 
years later, when Kiyo Bank and Howa Bank became the first banks to apply for injection in 
August 2006. The banks received capital in in November and December of 2006, 
respectively. The banks requested ¥39 billion total, with Kiyo bank requesting ¥30 billion 
and Howa Bank requesting ¥9 billion. They eventually received ¥40.5 billion, with Kiyo Bank 
receiving an additional ¥1.5 billion more than requested (DICJ 2020b).   
After the amendment to the ASFF in 2008, 11 additional financial institutions participated 
the scheme, receiving a total of ¥309 billion. After a second amendment in 2011, which also 
extended the application period, an additional 21 institutions participated in the injection, 
receiving ¥309.1 billion (of which 13 financial institutions were designated as “Great East 
Japan Earthquake impacted financial institutions”). In December 2016, the Japanese 
government extended of the application period again, through March 31, 2022. Since 
December 2016, two institutions have applied, receiving ¥16.24 billion yen. The evolution 
of the law and its utilization can be seen above in Figure 1. 
Thirty institutions participated in the capital injection scheme, with some institutions 
participating multiple times. As of the end of September 2020, the Japanese government had 
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¥684.04 billion capital injected, and ¥200.5 billion has been repaid so far, leaving ¥483.54 
billion the remaining balance. (See Figure 2 below.) (DICJ 2020b). 
Figure 2: ASFF Cumulative Injections and Repurchases 
 
Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan n.d.  
Of financial institutions that participated in the capital injection program, five have repaid or 
repurchased shares either partially or in full (77 Bank, Kiyo Bank, Howa Bank, North Pacific 
Bank, and Kirayaka Bank). Both Howa Bank and Kiyo Bank repurchased their preferred 
shares within 10 years of the capital injection. Under the extension made during the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy, two of the remaining 28 banks, North Pacific Bank and Kirayaka Bank, 
repurchased their preferred shares. Only one bank in the subsequent extensions, 77 Bank, 
has repaid the amount injected. (See Figure 3). 
There is still a substantial amount of capital outstanding from the series of capital injections.  
The capital injection framework was utilized most during the Global Financial Crisis and in 
the aftermath of the Great East Japan earthquake. The Fukushima region has seen an 
economic recovery, but it is unclear the extent to which the regional banking sector played a 
role. Similarly, while banks have utilized the legislation after the amendment concerning 
Brexit was passed, it has been unclear the repercussions Brexit will have on financial stability 
and regional banking needs, and so far no banks have applied the capital injection since the 
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1-Jan-13 1-Apr-24 Y 
Repurchased in full (repurchase amount: ¥9.144 billion) in 
Mar 2014. The issuer also received capital participation of 
¥16 billion. Repurchased the remaining ¥70 billion 








1-Oct-10 1-Oct-24 Y 
Repurchased in full (repurchase amount: ¥20.078 billion) in 
Dec 2012. Implemented along with the issuance of new 







29-Dec-10 29-Dec-24 N 
Partially repurchased ¥20 billion (out of ¥35 billion, 











NA NA Y Exercised the option to repay in full in June 2015. 
* Names of financial institutions in parenthesis refer to the entities that effectively received capital participation.  
** Preferred Shares with voting rights to appoint or dismiss directors. 
*** Earthquake-impacted financial institution.  
Source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan n.d. 
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 Japan Context 2004 - 2006 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$5.02 trillion in 2004 
$4.56 trillion in 2005 
$4.58 trillion in 2006 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$37,689 in 2004 
$37,218 in 2005 
$35,434 in 2006 
Sovereign credit rating (Five-year senior 
debt) 














Size of banking system 
$7.37 trillion in 2004 
$6.77 trillion in 2005 
$6.93 trillion in 2006 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
146.8% in 2004 
148.5% in 2005 
151.2% in 2006 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
46.9% in 2004 
47.7% in 2005 
50.0% in 2006 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 
52.4% in 2004 
51.9% in 2005 
51.4% in 2006 
Foreign involvement in banking system Data not available for 2004–06 
Government ownership of banking system Data not available for 2004–06 
Existence of deposit insurance 
Yes in 2004–06 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, World Bank Global Financial Development Database, World 
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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Key Design Decisions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
1. Part of a Package: The Japanese government originally passed the Act on Strengthening 
Financial Functions (ASFF) as a stand-alone package. Later amendments to the ASFF 
were incorporated as part of various policy packages, often responding to the external 




Source: Authors’ analysis 
 
5 Some consider the ASFF as part of the Program for Financial Revival or the Financial Reconstruction Program, a 
framework established in October 2002 to reduce non-performing loans (Matsubayashi 2015, 20; Endo 2013). In July 
2003, a public discussion paper on the public capital injection scheme was published, and the ASFF was eventually 
designed under the discussed frameworks (Oomori 2017, 3–4; Financial Function Enhancement Examination 
Committee 2003).  
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The original Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) was passed as a stand-alone package, 
without any other accompanying legislation (Hirano 2004; House of Representatives, Japan 2004).5 
Meanwhile, it can be regarded as one of the components in the series of broad-based capital 
injections throughout the Japanese financial crisis. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the Financial 
Function Stabilization Act and the Prompt Recapitalization Act in 1998 were the two broad-based 
capital injection frameworks that preceded the ASFF.  
Figure 4: Timeline of YPFS Japanese Broad-Based Capital Injection Cases 
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 Figure 5: Summary and Timeline of Japanese Capital Injection Frameworks  
Feb 
1998 
Financial Function Stabilization Act6 (Unnava 2021a) 
(Broad-based Capital Injection Scheme)   
¥1.8 trillion was injected in subordinated debt and loans and preferred shares. 
Three out of 21 participating banks were regional banks (Bank of Yokohama, Hokuriku Bank, and 
Ashikaga bank). 
By 2017, all banks had repurchased their shares, loans, and debts. 
Most banks received a similar amount of capital (approximately ¥100 billion) simultaneously in 
March 1998. 




Prompt Recapitalization Act7 (Unnava 2021 b) 
(Broad-based Capital Injection Scheme)   
Between 1998-2001, ¥8.6 trillion capital was injected in in subordinated debt and loans and preferred 
shares. 
The underwriting terms, size, and timing of the capital injection were tailored to each banks’ needs. 
The application window closed in March 2001.  
May  
2000 
Deposit Insurance Act (measures against financial crisis)  
(Ad-hoc Capital Injection Scheme)  
While Financial Function Stabilization Act and Prompt Recapitalization Act had clear sunset dates, the 
amendment of the Deposit Insurance Act enabled ad-hoc capital injections to solvent banks under 
Article 102 (1). 




Organizational Restructuring Act 
(Ad-hoc Capital Injection Scheme)  
This new law enabled the government ad-hoc capital injection to merging and restructuring banks 
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Source: Authors’ analysis 
However, compared to other schemes, the ASFF is a unique preemptive broad-based capital 
injection scheme, targeting regional banks8 and cooperatives9. The ASFF was established to focus 
more on the regional banking sector, which was not necessarily the focus of the previous schemes 
(Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010).  
Subsequent amendments were sometimes packed with other economic or financial policies. For 
instance, the amendment in 2008 corresponded with economic policies at the Enterprise 
Turnaround Initiative Corporation of Japan and the SME Revitalization Support Councils (Hatanaka 
2012; Endo 2013). Furthermore, the JFSA and media often emphasized the coordination of the 
COVID-19 related ASFF 2020 amendment and the Special Act under the Anti-Trust Law (FSA 2020). 
Lastly, the most recent amendment in June 2021 was paired with revisions in other laws; one 
banking law revision eased restrictions on the scope of bank's business and equity investments, and 
 
6 金融機能安定化法 in Japanese, cited as Act on Emergency Measures for Financial Functions Stabilization (Former 
Financial Functions Stabilization Act) on the DICJ website.  
7 早期健全化法(Soukikenzenkahou) in Japanese, cited as Act on Emergency Measures for Early Strengthening of 
Financial Functions (Early Strengthening Act) on the DICJ website. 
8 In Japan, there are first-tier regional banks, which operate in one or a few prefectures, and second-tier regional 
banks, which are smaller than first-tier regional banks and operate mainly within a prefecture. In this YPFS case, we 
call both “regional banks”.  
9 Cooperatives include those operating within a prefecture and specializing in small and medium-sized enterprise 
loans, so-called shinkin, community-based credit union, so-called shinkumi, etc. 
which capital adequacy ratios are below the requirement.  













Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) and further amendments 
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 another investment law was intended to promote overseas investors’ participation in Japanese 
financial markets (Jiji Press 2021).  
2. Legal Authority: The Japanese Diet formally passed the ASFF.  
In January 2004, in response to the burgeoning nonperforming loan issue at regional banks, the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet submitted the Act on Strengthening Financial Functions to the Japanese 
Diet, earmarking ¥2 trillion for public capital injections into regional banks. On June 14, 2004, the 
Japanese Diet finally passed the bill, two days before the end of the 159th Diet Session (House of 
Representatives, Japan 2004). Each subsequent amendment passed through the Diet successfully 
as well.  
3. Communication: The Prime Minister’s office publicly announced each recapitalization 
bill and subsequent amendments; the Diet debated each publicly before passing the bills 
and amendments. 
The Prime Minister’s office publicly announced each recapitalization bill and the subsequent 
amendments. The Diet debated each bill and amendment publicly before officially passing them. 
Occasionally, the Minister of State for Financial Service also released official statements.  
4. Governance and Administration: The ASFF capital injection framework involves 
ministers from a number of relevant ministries, the prime minister, the Financial 
Function Enhancement Examination Committee, and the Deposit Insurance Corporation 
of Japan (DICJ).  
Multiple stakeholders are involved in the ASFF capital injection scheme, including ministers from 
relevant ministries, prime minister, the Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee 
(Committee), and the DICJ.  
The Japanese Financial Services Agency (JFSA), under the Ministry of Finance, was tasked to form 
the Committee 10  to assess applications and oversee the implementation of the plans for the 
recapitalization (House of Representatives, Japan 2004, 48). The Committee consisted of part-time 
members appointed by the prime minister serving three-year terms (House of Representatives, 
Japan 2004, 49,51). The maximum number of members is 6 people (The House of Representatives, 
Japan 2021).  The JFSA website hosts the Committee’s meeting minutes soon after the meeting and 
transcripts are publicly disclosed three years after meetings (Financial Function Enhancement 
Examination Committee 2004, 5). As of June 2021, according to the JFSA website, the Committee 
has met 25 times over the span of the ongoing recapitalization (Financial Service Agency, n.d.).  
The Committee evaluates the management enhancement plan submitted by the applicant financial 
institutions. The involved ministers—including the Commissioner of JFSA or the Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, depending on the type of the financial institution, the Minister 
 
10  This committee has also been referred to as the “Banking Function Reinforcement Study Council” and the 
“Examination Committee for Strengthening Financial Functions”, referred as 金 融 機 能 強 化 審 査 会 
(Kinyuukinoukyoukashinsakai) in Japanese. 
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 of Finance, and prime minister—receive reports. The ministers also have the right to approve or 
request exercise rights, including conversions. Voting rights are only exercised if the banks with 
preferred shares do not pay their dividends (see Key Design Decision #11 for further detail) 
(Sakaguchi 2020).11 
The DICJ entrusts the operation of capital participation, management, and disposal to the RCC, a 
subsidiary of the DICJ. The RCC 12  was created as a merger between the Housing Loan 
Administration Corporation and the Resolution and Collection Bank on April 1, 1999, under the 
Financial Revitalization Act. The RCC is funded entirely by the DICJ (DICJ 2020a). The DICJ acts 
independently of the Bank of Japan or the Treasury, though in close cooperation (Financial Stability 
Board 2016).  
The RCC has been responsible for managing capital and making purchases as determined by the 
Committee. Funded by the DICJ, the RCC purchased either preferred stocks, subordinated bonds and 
debt, preferred investments, or trust beneficiary rights from the financial institutions that applied 
for capital injections under the ASFF (Hoshi and Kashyap 2010). 
The actual capital injection operations vary based on the characteristics of the financial institutions 
applying for the injection. For instance, the support for financial institutions undergoing 
restructuring is different than that of institutions that are not undergoing restructuring. Also, non-
banks (e.g., cooperative structured central financial institutions) and banks that are affected by 
earthquakes or COVID-19 receive a different treatment in application, screening, and funding (DICJ 
2020a).  
5. Size: The original ASFF, as passed in June 2004, set the DICJ’s Financial Functions 
Strengthening Account to ¥2 trillion. As the Act was amended multiple times, the size 
grew to ¥15 trillion.   
When the ASFF was passed in June 2004, the DICJ;s Financial Functions Strengthening Account had 
a budget of ¥2 trillion. As the Act was amended over the years, the size expanded to ¥15 trillion. So 
far, as of the end of September 2020, the Japanese government had utilized ¥684.04 billion in 
capital, only 4.5% of the full capacity (DICJ 2020b). 
6. Timing: Each financial institution received capital once its application (including the 
management plan) had been screened by the Financial Function Enhancement 
Examination Committee and accepted by the Japanese government. 
Unlike the Prompt Recapitalization Act or other past capital injection frameworks, each financial 
institution received their capital on their own application timeframe, and there was no coordinated 
schedule across the various financial institutions. Each financial institution received capital once its 
 
11 So far, Howa Bank (received capital in December 2006) has been the only bank that borrowed capital in preferred 
shares with voting rights to appoint or dismiss directors (DICJ 2020b). 
12  For more information regarding the RCC and its operations, please refer to the “Resolution and Collection 
Corporation” YPFS case study (Dreyer 2021). 
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 application (including the management plan) had been screened by the Financial Function 
Enhancement Examination Committee and accepted by the Japanese government. 
7. Source of Injections: The DICJ’s Financial Functions Strengthening Account is funded 
through the issuance of government-backed DICJ bonds, borrowings from financial 
institutions or other investors, and in rare instances, directly from the Bank of Japan.  
The DICJ holds the Financial Functions Strengthening Account, which is specifically dedicated for 
the ASFF. Under Article 29, paragraph (1) of the ASFF Act, the DICJ’s Financial Functions 
Strengthening Account is funded through the issuance of government-backed DICJ bonds and 
borrowings from financial institutions, other investors, and in rare instances, directly from the Bank 
of Japan (Financial Stability Board 2016; DICJ 2020a). Under Article 45 of the ASFF, the government 
guarantees the account (Financial Stability Board 2016; DICJ 2020a).13 The extent to which DICJ 
funded the ASFF recapitalization from either source is shown in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: Funding Status of the Financial Functions Strengthening Account 
 
Note: Years in Japanese fiscal year (April – March next year). 
 
13 DICJ bond issuances and borrowings are subject to ceilings set out in the Deposit Insurance Act 
and are complemented by annual budgetary appropriations (as approved by the Diet) for the 
amount guaranteed by the government. (Financial Stability Board 2016). The government 
guarantee ceiling was ¥12 trillion in the budget for fiscal year 2020 and ¥15 trillion for the second 
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 Source: DICJ 2020a. 
 
Meanwhile, the funding source for financial institutions that undergo mergers and management 
integration under the ASFF capital injection scheme introduced in May 2021 is slightly different. 
The revised ASFF now provides approximately a third of the initial cost of system integration and 
branch consolidation, accounting for about ¥3 billion (Nikkei 2021; Jiji Press 2021). 
8. Eligible Institutions: Initially, all financial institutions—both banks and non-banks—
were eligible for the ASFF application but were required to target SME financing in 
regional economy. In later amendments, the ASFF established special treatment for 
financial institutions that were affected by the Great East Earthquake (June 2011 
Amendment), by the COVID-19 (June 2020 Amendment), and that undergo mergers and 
management integration (May 2021 Amendment). 
Unlike some of the previous recapitalizations, the ASFF did not require financial institutions to be 
of systemic importance to receive capital injections using public funds. The Committee accepts 
applications from financial institutions that fail to fulfill the capital adequacy requirements (but are 
not bankrupt or insolvent) or financial institutions that meet the capital adequacy requirements but 
intend to undertake a fundamental organizational restructuring (Ikenaga and Watanabe 2008).  
Any domestic or foreign bank was eligible for capital injection; however, no foreign banks 
participated (Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 2020b). 
The law did not require the participation of any banks, and the application was voluntarily. It did 
allow the participation of specific non-banks, listed explicitly: Norinchukin Bank, the Long-Term 
Credit Bank, the Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives, Fisheries Cooperative Association, and the 
Federation of Fisheries Processing Cooperatives. The law also allowed the participation of shinkin 
banks, labor unions, credit cooperatives (shinkumi), and bank holding companies (House of 
Representatives, Japan 2004).14 
Furthermore, after the amendment in 2008, the focus on SMEs in the regional economy intensified 
(Ikenaga and Watanabe 2008). After the collapse of the Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, 
the Japanese government proposed the Comprehensive Immediate Policy Package to Ease Public 
Anxiety, with fears over how global economic events might lead to a credit crunch for SMEs (Aso 
2008; Yamori et al. 2013). In the new iteration of the program, the facilitation of credit to SMEs 
became a special focus in management plans submitted. The amendment extended the period for 
application from March 31, 2008 to March 31, 2012. 
Following the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Diet passed an amendment to the existing 
recapitalization legislation with special clauses for regional institutions supporting the 
 
14 The amendment of 2008 newly created an injection scheme for the Central Organization of Cooperative Structured 
Financial Institution, enabling easier access to capital support to each non-banks as well as reinforcing the financial 
soundness of the for the Central Organization of Cooperative Structured Financial Institution (Ikenaga and Watanabe 
2008). 
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 revitalization of areas affected by the earthquake (FSA 2011a).  In this amendment, the Japanese 
government extended the application period for capital injections, in addition to creating special 
treatment for those institutions impacted by the Great East Japan Earthquake. Similarly, the June 
2020 amendment established special treatment for financial institutions that were affected by 
COVID-19. 
The affected institution can apply for a capital injection without being screened for the feasibility of 
the targets in the management plan or feasibility of repayment within 15 years  (Rhee and Unnava 
2020). Affected institutions are those whose “financial statements have gotten considerably worse 
due to the coronavirus or measures to prevent coronavirus, or if the financial institution needs to 
lend to companies that are affected by coronavirus or measures to prevent coronavirus” (Rhee and 
Unnava 2020). Sakaguchi (2020) assumes that eventually all financial institutions should fall under 
these criteria.  
Lastly, the 2021 amendment related to COVID-19 covers approximately one-third of initial costs 
related to business integration, including system and branch consolidations for those financial 
institutions undergoing mergers and organizational restructuring (Jiji Press 2021). While the 
promotion of mergers and reorganization is similar the Organizational Restructuring Act (a capital 
injection scheme that was established in December 2002), financial institutions can apply for the 
capital injection even when their capital adequacy ratios are above the requirement. According to 
the revised Act, financial institutions that wish to receive capital for system and branch 
consolidations will submit an “implementation plan,” indicating their outlook for the reorganization 
and contribution to the regional economy (The House of Representatives, Japan 2021).  
9. Individual Participation Limits: No explicit statement limiting individual participation 
was found in the legal documents. 
No explicit statement limiting individual participation was found in the legal documents. As of 
September 2020, the largest capital injected was ¥100 billion (North Pacific Bank in March 2009), 
and the mean and median of the capital received were ¥18.5 billion and ¥15 billion, respectively 
(DICJ 2020b).  
10. Capital Characteristics: The capital characteristics were determined on a case-by-case 
basis; thus far, 18 financial institutions received capital in the form of convertible 
preferred shares, 13 in trust beneficial rights, five in preferred investments, and one in 
subordinated loans. No financial institution has received capital in the form of common 
shares, though it is an available option in certain circumstances.  
The capital characteristics and terms were decided on a case-by-case basis (DICJ 2020b). Ultimately, 
the Committee utilized a combination of preferred shares, subordinated debt, priority investment, 
and trust beneficiary rights for capital injections over the multiple injection windows.  
So far, 18 banks received capital in the form of convertible preferred shares, 13 non-banks in trust 
beneficial rights, five non-banks in preferred investments, and one bank in the form of a 
subordinated loan (DICJ 2020b). No financial institution has received in capital support in the form 
of common shares, though it is an option if the financial institution’s capital ratio is below the 
regulatory requirement (Aso 2008; House of Representatives, Japan 2004; FSA 2008; House of 
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 Representatives, Japan 2011; 2016; Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan 2020a). A detailed 
table listing of the characteristics and the terms for capital is available in the Appendix.  
11. Term/Dividends/Pricing: Terms were proposed by the applicant institutions via 
management plans, which were then considered by the Committee.  
Applicant institutions proposed terms via their management plans, which were then considered by 
the Committee (Financial Service Agency, n.d.; House of Representatives, Japan 2004). A detailed 
table listing of the characteristics and the terms for capital is available in the Appendix. 
It appears that financial institutions proposed granular terms in their plans—including repayment 
dates, dividend rates, and instruments to be used for injection—which were then reviewed by the 
Committee. These terms were presented to members in the Committee meetings and then approved 
or rejected. There appear to have been no rejections of financial institution applications at any point, 
including the revisions to management plans after the plan periods ended.  
Management plans were evaluated along several criteria, listed in Figure 7 below. 
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 Figure 7: Evaluation Criteria for Management Enhancement Plans 
Category Evaluation Strategy Notes 
Strategies for Achieving Goals 
- Streamline operations 
- Dispose of assets unnecessary for operations 
or unprofitable 
- Specialize in profitable areas 
 
Establishing a Responsible 
Management System 
- Appoint new external members to the board 
- Strengthen the independence of those 
members 
  
Improving the Legal Compliance 
System 
- Create a committee of lawyers, certified 
public accountants, and other third parties 
specifically to improve compliance with 
existing laws 
- Improve the internal audit system 
 
Ensuring Objectivity of 
Management Evaluations 
- Establish a third-party committee to evaluate 
management 
- Use performance-based compensation 
Note that cooperatives should 
follow management guidance by 
the central cooperative 
institution. 
Improving Information Disclosure 
- Improving disclosure each quarter 
- Provide clearer and richer information on 
profits and losses 
- Increase information on contributions to the 
regional economy of the financial institution 
 
Management Accountability if 
Goals are not Achieved 
- Providing a clear statement that management 
will retire 
  
Defining Management and 
Shareholder Liability 
- Noting the representing officer submitting a 
request for capital will resign immediately if 
the Financial Function Enhancement 
Examination Committee decides to give capital 
to the financial institution 
- Clarifying the financial institution will not 
request the underwriting of any shares until 
management has resigned 
 
Facilitating Credit Provision and 
Revitalization of Regional 
Economies 
- Providing two or more indicators to show the 
status of contributions to the regional 
economy 
- Calculating actual or expected results during 
the implementation of the management plan 
- Describing the basic approach to smoothing 
credit provision 
(a) One indicator must be the 
ratio of the number of regional 
business partners to the total 
number of business partners that 
a financial institution has. 
(b) If a financial institution is 
operating in multiple regions and 
approaches differ with each 
region, write each approach. 
Share Underwriting 
- Stating the amount, content, and timing of the 
underwriting terms 
 
Source: FSA, n.d. 
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 The requisite information on underwriting terms were also evaluated, shown below in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Evaluation Strategy for Proposed Share Underwriting. 
Category Evaluation Strategy 
Stock 
- Type, total paid-in capital, number of shares issued, paid-in capital, issuing 
method, and non-capitalized shares 
- "the contents listed in each item of article 108, Paragraph 1 of the Companies 
Act" 
- the number of voting rights and percentage of voting rights of all shareholders 
who have voting rights 
- the right to receive the total allotment of shares and the right to request 
conversion of those shares 
Subordinated Bonds 
- Total amount of bonds, interest rate, redemption method and time limit, 
interest payment method and time limit, details of subordinated special 
agreements, etc. 
Preferred Investments 
- Type, total amount paid, number of units issued, amount paid, method of 
issuance and non-capitalized amount 
- "Contents listed in Article 5, Paragraph 1, Items 2-4 of the Act on Priority 
Investment of Cooperative Financial Institutions" 
Subordinated Loans 
- Borrowing amount, interest, method and term of repayment of the principal 
and interest payments, details of the special agreement, etc 
Source: FSA, n.d. 
The application also required banks to submit their capital status, as well as balance sheet 
information, for evaluation. While the Committee did not explicitly require increased SME lending 
as part of the original application for capital injection, the Committee evaluated the plans against 
this criterion before the amendment to the legislation in 2008 (FSA, n.d.; House of Representatives, 
Japan 2004).  
These requirements for management plans and capital status were radically eased after several 
amendments (Figure 1). For instance, management responsibility is no longer strictly pursued after 
the 2008 amendment. Furthermore, in the 2011 amendment, the government introduced multiple 
exemptions of requirements for financial institutions that were affected by the Great East 
Earthquake. Such exemptions included the requirement to set numerical targets and establish a 
responsible management system. After the 2020 amendment, these exemptions from the 
requirements eventually expanded to COVID-19 affected financial institutions (which are assumed 
to be all financial institutions, according to Sakaguchi 2020).  
As seen in the Appendix, preferred shares had mandatory conversion dates to common shares, 
while trust rights ranged in period from 10 to 25 years, though the terms were potentially 
extendable (DICJ 2020b). The beginning of the conversion period for the convertible preferred 
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shares also varied from bank to bank, sometimes as early as within a month (e.g., Kirayaka Bank 
and Howa Bank), or more than seven years after the capital injection (Michinoku Bank) (DICJ 
2020b).   
After the capital injection, the conversion price is often calculated as the average of the common 
equity (stock) price over the week preceding the calculation. The conversion price on convertible 
preferred shares has a “floor price.” The floor price is often calculated as 50% of the average price 
of common stock when the capital was injected to the targeted financial institution. There is no 
“ceiling” price in the convertible preferred shares (Sakaguchi 2020).  
After the 2008 amendment, financial institutions were given the option to buy the preferred stock 
at book value, the equivalent to providing a call option for financial institutions. This option can be 
exercised if the stock price continuously falls under the conversion price and if banks request the 
JFSA to do so. Sakaguchi (2020) notes that the stock prices of many of the banks affected by the 
Great Earthquake fall under the floor price.15  
For preferred investments, so far, all the receivers have been Shinkumi Federation banks, in the 
form of preferred perpetual investments (noncumulative corporate bonds). In terms of trust 
beneficial rights, the trust period has been either 10 or 25 years, which is can also be extendable. 
For those with 10 year trust periods, it is stipulated that within 10 years following the capital 
injection, either “authorization of management improvement” or “authorization of capital 
reorganization associated with business restructuring” will be obtained (DICJ 2020b). 
In terms of capital with voting rights, the DICJ clarifies on its website that it can exercise its rights 
as a shareholder and investor, considering three factors:  
In addition, the DICJ pays attention to if its exercise of rights is consistent with administrative 
policies and measures. However, available information doesn’t clarify to what extent the DICJ or 
RCC have exercised those rights. 
 
15 This is not only because the stock price of the Great Earthquake affected banks hover low, but also because the floor 
price of those banks was arbitrarily set higher compared to non-affected banks (Sakaguchi 2020, 9). The floor price 
adjustment is not mentioned in the ASFF Act legal text but rather implemented on the ad-hoc capital design basis. 
Sakaguchi (2020) warns that the higher floor price may be functioning as the permanent subsidies for certain banks, 
narrowing the exit of the program.  
(1) If it contributes to maintaining the soundness of bank management, 
(2) If it contributes to securing a repayment source of public funds, 
(3) If it is in accordance with the purposes of the law, such as financial facilitating, on which 
capital injection of public funds has been based (DICJ, n.d.).  
335
Japan’s Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) Unnava and Oguri
 12. Allocation of losses to existing stakeholders: ASFF did not seem to require any write-
downs to the existing shareholders at the participating institutions.  
No further detail has been found for this Key Design Decision.  
13. Debt restructuring plan: The debt restructuring plan in the ASFF was to be implemented 
according to the management plan submitted by financial institutions upon the 
application of the ASFF.  
There appear to have been no rejections of financial institution applications at any point, including 
revisions to management plans after plan periods ended.  
Each financial institution reports the ongoing status of the management plan, and the JFSA publishes 
those reports annually on its website. Furthermore, if the management plan were to be revised, they 
are rescreened and reexamined by the Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee 
(Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee 2004). 
The application also required banks to submit their capitalization status, as well as balance sheet 
information, for evaluation. While the Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee did 
not explicitly require increased SME lending as part of the original application for capital injection, 
the Committee evaluated organizations along this criterion before the amendment to the legislation 
in 2008 (Financial Service Agency, n.d.; House of Representatives, Japan 2004). However, these 
requirements in the management plan and capitalization status were radically eased after several 
amendments (Figure 1). For instance, management responsibility no longer strictly pursued after 
the 2008 amendment. Furthermore, in 2011 amendment, the government introduced multiple 
exemptions of requirements for financial institutions that were affected by the Great East 
Earthquake amendment. Such exemptions included the requirement to set numerical targets and 
establish a responsible management system. After the 2020 amendment, these exemptions of the 
requirements eventually expanded to COVID-19 affected financial institutions (which are assumed 
to be all financial institutions, according to Sakaguchi 2020).  
14. Fate of existing board and management: Initially, the government required the highest 
levels of management to resign upon receipt of the capital injection; later amendments 
limited the government to request members of the board or management to resign only 
if the financial institution’s capital ratio was below 4% when the institution applied for 
capital injection. 
In the original, stricter version of management plans, the government required the highest levels of 
management to resign upon receipt of capital injection. In addition, external board members were 
required to be appointed if they were not already part of the board. Later, the government could 
request members of the board or management to resign only if the financial institution’s capital 
ratio was below 4% when the institution applied for capital injection.   
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15. Exit Strategy: Some form of capitals (subordinated loans and preferred shares) have a 
clear exit strategy, while injection in the form of preferred investments have no explicit 
exit date.  
Of the banks that participated in the capital injection program, five have repaid or repurchased 
shares either partially or in full. Both Howa Bank and Kiyo Bank repurchased their preferred shares 
within ten years of the capital injection. Under the extension made during the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy, two of the remaining 28 banks, North Pacific Bank and Kirayaka Bank, repurchased 
their preferred shares. Only one bank in the subsequent extensions, 77 Bank, has repaid the amount 
injected. (See the Appendix). As of the end of September 2020, the Japanese government had 
¥684.04 billion capital injected, and ¥200.5 billion has been repaid so far, leaving ¥483.54 billions 
the remaining balance. 
In October 2005, the DICJ published “Immediate Guideline for Disposal of Preferred Stocks, etc. 
Acquired through Capital Injection with Public Funds” and clarified the criteria for repayment and 
disposal (DICJ 2005). According to this guideline, the DICJ will dispose the preferred stocks and 
other capital under the following three situations:  
Banks were expected to reacquire their shares within 15 years of purchase. In practice, the 
mandatory acquisition date for financial institutions varied, with some institutions facing 
mandatory acquisition dates within ten years and some firms facing mandatory acquisition dates 
25 years after injection. Additional variation occurred in trust periods, with some firms receiving 
ten-year periods and some firms receiving 25-year periods, though all were extendable (DICJ 
2020b). For those with ten-year periods, the allocation required they receive an additional approval 
for management plans. Injection through preferred investments have no explicit exit date, as each 
preferred investment is a preferred perpetual investment injection.  
References and Key Program Documents 
 (Abe 2016) Abe, Shinzo. September 26, 2016. “Policy Speech by Prime Minister to the 192th Session 
of the Diet. ” 
A speech by the Prime Minister to the Diet in 2016.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/index.php/library/policy-speech-prime-minister-192th-session-diet. 
(Aso 2008) Aso, Taro. September 29, 2008. “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Taro Aso to the 170th 
Session of the Diet.”  
A speech by the Prime Minister to the Diet in 2008.  
(1) If the recapitalized financial institution requests the selling of Preferred Stocks to third 
parties (including sale in the capital market) 
(2) If the recapitalized financial institutions request for repaying the public funds injected 
(3) If disposing is strongly preferable under the given market conditions.  
337
Japan’s Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) Unnava and Oguri
 https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/index.php/library/policy-speech-prime-minister-taro-aso-170th-
session-diet. 
(Aso 2020) Aso, Taro. May 27, 2020. “Amendment to the ‘Act on Special Measures for Strengthening 
Financial Functions’ (Statement by ASO Taro, Minister of State for Financial Services).”  




(Bank of Japan 2017) Bank of Japan. April 2017. “Financial System Report.”  
The BOJ’s financial sector report for 2017.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/financial-system-report-1. 
(Bank of Japan 2020) Bank of Japan. November 10, 2020. “Introduction of ‘Special Deposit Facility 
to Enhance the Resilience of the Regional Financial System.’”  
A press release announcing the establishment of a special facility in response to the Covid-19 crisis.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/introduction-special-deposit-facility-enhance-resilience-
regional-financial-system. 
(DICJ 2005) Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan. October 2005. “Immediate Guideline for 
Disposal of Preferred Stocks, Etc. Acquired through Capital Injection with Public Funds.” Deposit 
Insurance Corporation of Japan.  
Guidelines from the DICJ regarding the disposal of preferred stocks and subordinated bonds as part of 
the recapitalization by the RCC.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/immediate-guideline-disposal-preferred-stocks-etc-acquired-
through-capital-injection-public. 
(DICJ 2020a) Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan. August 2020. “Annual Report 2019/2020.” 
The 2019-2020 annual report from the DICJ.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/annual-report-2019-2020. 
(DICJ 2020b) Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan. September 2020. “Capital Participation 
Operations Pursuant to the Financial Functions Strengthening Act : Deposit Insurance Corporation 
of Japan.” Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan.  
Operational details of the recapitalizations under the Act.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/capital-participation-operations-pursuant-financial-functions-
strengthening-act. 
(Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan, n.d.) Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan. no date. 
“Basic Policy in Exercising a Voting Right as a Shareholder.” Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan. 
Accessed June 17, 2021.  
An outline of how the DICJ examines its role in exercising its voting rights as a shareholder. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/basic-policy-exercising-voting-right-shareholder. 
(Dreyer 2021) Dreyer, Mallory. 2021. “The Resolution and Collection Corporation of Japan.” 
A YPFS case study on the broad-based asset management company in Japan after the 1990s financial 
338
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 crisis. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol3/iss2/21/. 
(Endo 2013) Endo, Toshihide. March 8, 2013. “Post-Crisis Regulation of Financial Institutions in 
Japan.” Presented at the ADBI-JFSA Joint Conference, March 8.  
A presentation regarding the evolution of financial regulation after the Japanese and global financial 
crises. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/post-crisis-regulation-financial-institutions-japan. 
(Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee 2003) Financial Function Enhancement 
Examination Committee. July 2003. “金融機関に対する公的資金制度のあり方について.”  
A document outlining funding and support of financial institutions in Japan.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/jinrongjiguanniduisurugongdezijinzhidunoarifangnitsuite-
about-public-funding-system. 
(Financial Function Enhancement Examination Committee 2004) Financial Function Enhancement 
Examination Committee. August 2004. “金融機能強化審査会議事録. ” 
The meeting minutes from a 2004 meeting of an FSA committee.  
https://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/soff/gijiroku/20040806/01_a.pdf. 
(FSA 2008) Financial Service Agency. December 16, 2008. “「金融機能の強化のための特別措置に
関する法律施行令の一部を改正する政令」及び「金融機能の強化のための特別措置に関する内
閣 府 令 の 一 部 を 改 正 す る 内 閣 府 令 」 等 に つ い て ： 金 融 庁 .” 
A document outlining the cabinet amendments to acts allowing support to financial institutions. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/index.php/node/18046. 
(FSA 2011a) Financial Service Agency. May 2011. “金融機能強化法等の改正に係る説明資料.” May. 
A presentation providing additional guidance on the amendments to the act. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/jinrongjinengqianghuafadengnogaizhengnixirushuomingziliao. 
(FSA 2020) Financial Service Agency. August 2020. “Fight against COVID-19 and Develop a Better 
Post-COVID Society.”  
A letter from the FSA outlining its priorities.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/fight-against-covid-19-and-develop-better-post-covid-society. 
(FSA 2021) Financial Service Agency. May 28, 2021. “令和３年金融機能強化法改正に係る政令・
内閣府令案等の公表について. ”  
A website listing the amendments to the act in 2021.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library-1.  
(FSA, n.d.) Financial Service Agency. no date. “金融機能強化審査会.” Financial Service Agency. 
Accessed  June  18,  2021. 
339
Japan’s Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) Unnava and Oguri
 A webpage with an overview of the Financial Function Examination Committee and the agendas. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/jinrongjinengqianghuashenzhahui. 
(Financial Stability Board 2016) Financial Stability Board. December 21, 2016. “Peer Review of 
Japan.” 
A review from the FSB of the financial system, macroprudential, and financial stability frameworks. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/japan-peer-review. 
(Hatanaka 2012) Hatanaka, Ryutaro. February 10, 2012. “International Conference on ‘Asian 
Market Integration and Financial Innovation.’”   
A speech from the FSA Commissioner on Japanese financial stability measures.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/international-conference-asian-market-integration-and-
financial-innovation. 
(Himino 2021) Himino, Ryozo. 2021. The Japanese Banking Crisis. Singapore: Springer Singapore. 
A book providing analysis on the Japanese banking crises of the 1990s.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/japanese-banking-crisis. 
(Hirano 2004) Hirano, Ko. January 24, 2004. “Realignment of Local Lenders Said Pivotal.” The Japan 
Times.  Tokyo, Japan. 
A Japan Times article on the shift from bad loan cleanup to profitability among banks.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/realignment-local-lenders-said-pivotal. 
(Hoshi and Ito 2004) Hoshi, Takeo, and Takatoshi Ito. December 2004. “Financial Regulation in 
Japan: A Sixth Year Review of the Financial Services Agency.” Journal of Financial Stability 1 (2): 
229–43. 
The paper provides a critical review of the Financial Services Agency (FSA) of Japan since its 
establishment in June 1998 (as the Financial Supervisory Agency) to June 2004.  
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/1-s2.0-S1572308904000233-
main.pdf. 
(Hoshi and Kashyap 2010) Hoshi, Takeo, and Anil K Kashyap. 2010. “Will the U.S. Bank 
Recapitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan.” Journal of Financial Economics 97 (3): 398–
417. 
A research paper analyzing the US response to the Global Financial Crisis applying lessons from the 
Japanese financial crisis.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/ document/will-us-bank-recapitalization-succeed-eight-
lessons-japan.  
(House of Representatives, Japan 2004) House of Representatives, Japan. June 18, 2004. 金融機能
の強化のための特別措置に関する法律 . 
The text of the Law Concerning Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions. 
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_housei.nsf/html/housei/15920040618128.htm. 
340
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 (House of Representatives, Japan 2011) House of Representatives, Japan. June 29, 2011. 東日本大
震災に対処して金融機関等の経営基盤の充実を図るための金融機能の強化のための特別措置
に関する法律及び金融機関等の組織再編成の促進に関する特別措置法の一部を改正する法律. 
The text of a bill that revised the Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions in 
2011. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library-2. 
(House of Representatives, Japan 2016) House of Representatives, Japan. December 2, 2016. 金融
資本市場をめぐる情勢の変化に対応して金融の機能の安定を確保するための金融機能の強化の
ための特別措置に関する法律等の一部を改正する法律案.  
The text of the bill that revised the Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions in 
2016. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/index.php/library-0. 
(House of Representatives, Japan 2020) House of Representatives, Japan. June 18, 2020. 金融機能
の強化のための特別措置に関する法律.  
The text of the Law on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Institutions of 2020. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/jinrongjinengnoqianghuanotamenotebiecuozhiniguansurufalu. 
(Ikenaga and Watanabe 2008) Ikenaga, Tomoaki, and Masayuki Watanabe. November 2008. 
“Amendment to Act on Special Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions.” 
A summary of changes to financial institution support under an amendment to the Act on Special 
Measures for Strengthening Financial Functions. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/amendment-act-special-measures-strengthening-financial-
functions. 
(IMF 2004) International Monetary Fund. April 2004. “Global Financial Stability Report Market 
Developments and Issues Chapter II Global Financial Market Developments.” International 
Monetary Fund. 
An excerpt from the 2004 IMF Financial Stability Report.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/global-financial-stability-report-market-developments-and-
issues-chapter-ii-global. 
(Jiji Press 2021) Jiji Press. May 19, 2021. “Japan Passes Bill to Spur Regional Bank Realignments.” 
Jiji Press.   
A news article on the Covid-19 related support for regional economies.   
https://jen.jiji.com/jc/eng?g=eco&k=2021051900711. 
(Koizumi 2002) Koizumi, Junichiro. October 30, 2002. “Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi (Regarding Comprehensive Measures to Accelerate Reform).” 




Japan’s Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) Unnava and Oguri
 (Matsubayashi 2015) Matsubayashi, Yoichi. March 2015. “The Effort to Stabilise the Financial 
System in Japan: An Outline and the Characteristics of the Programme for Financial Revival.” 




(Noda 2011)  Noda, Yoshihiko. April 28, 2011. “Speech on Fiscal Policy by Minister of Finance Noda 
at the 177th Session of the National Diet.” Japan Ministry of Finance.  
Speech on Fiscal Policy by Minister of Finance Noda at the 177th Session of the National Diet. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/speech-fiscal-policy-minister-finance-noda-177th-session-
national-diet. 
(Oomori 2017) Oomori, Kengo. February 27, 2017. “金融機関への公的資金投入をめぐる議論,” 
February, 11.  
A summary of the 2017 status of public funding and capital injections for Japanese financial 
institutions. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/jinrongjiguanhenogongdezijintouruwomekuruyilun. 
(Rhee and Unnava 2020) Rhee, June, and Vaasavi Unnava. June 19, 2020. “Japan Begins Capital 
Injections for Financial Institutions in Response to COVID-19.” Yale School of Management (blog). 




(Sakaguchi 2020) Sakaguchi, Junya. July 30, 2020. “改正金融機能強化法のコロナ特例措置がもた
らす功罪.”  
A summary of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on a law regarding financial institutions. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/gaizhengjinrongjinengqianghuafano-
koronatelicuozhikamotarasugongzui. 
(The House of Representatives, Japan 2021) The House of Representatives, Japan. May 2021. 金融
機能強化のための特別措置に関する法律施行令改正案.   
An amendment to the to the act in 2021.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/jinrongjinengqianghuanotamenotebiecuozhiniguansurufalushi
xinglinggaizhengan.  
(Unnava 2021a) Unnava, Vaasavi. November 12, 2021. “Financial Functions Stabilization Act.” 
Journal of Financial Crises. 
(Unnava 2021b) Unnava, Vaasavi. November 12, 2021. “Prompt Recapitalization Act.” Journal of 
Financial Crises. 
342
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 3
 (Yamori, Kondo, Tomimura, Shindo, and Takuku 2013) Yamori, Nobuyoshi, Kazumine Kondo, Kei 
Tomimura, Yuko Shindo, and Kenya Takuku. 2013. “Japanese Banking Regulations and SME 
Finance under the Global Financial Crisis.” Japanese Journal of Monetary and Financial Economics 1 
(1): 50–90. 
A paper that discusses important policy actions in Japanese banking regulation under the global 




Japan’s Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (ASFF) Unnava and Oguri
 
 Appendixes 
Appendix A : Details of the Preferred Shares (convertibles) 
Which 
ASFF? 






















T + 1.15 
(cap rate: 7.50) 
1-Oct-11 1-Oct-16 N 
Howa Bank** Dec-06 9 
1.84 (until March 2009) 
6m JPY TIBOR + 1.20 
(after March 2010 
1-Apr-08 
To be decided by 
the board of 
directors on or 






North Pacific Bank Mar-09 100 
T + 1.00 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
1-Jan-13 1-Apr-24 N 
Fukuho Bank Mar-09 6 
1.90 (until March 2012) 
T + 1.10 (after March 
2013) 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
1-Oct-11 1-Apr-24 N 
Minami Nippon Bank Mar-09 15 
T + 1.05 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
1-Oct-12 1-Apr-24 N 
Michinoku Bank Sep-09 20 
T + 0.95 
(cap rate: 8.00) 




T + 1.15 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
1-Oct-10 1-Oct-24 N 
San ju San FG 
(Daisan Bank)* 
Sep-09 30 
T + 1.00 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
1-Oct-12 1-Oct-24 N 
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Towa Bank Dec-09 35 
T + 1.15 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
29-Dec-10 29-Dec-24 N 
Bank of Kochi Dec-09 15 
T + 1.10 
(cap rate: 8.00) 




T + 1.00 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
1-Apr-13 1-Apr-25 N 
Miyazaki Taiyo Bank Mar-10 13 
T + 1.05 
(cap rate: 8.00) 





(Sendai Bank)*  
Sep-11 30 
Funding cost as an 
annualized rate of 
preferred dividend  *** 
1-Apr-13 1-Oct-36 Y 
Tsukuba Bank Sep-11 35 
Funding cost as an 
annualized rate of 
preferred dividend  *** 
1-Jul-12 1-Oct-31 Y 
Tohoku Bank Sep-12 10 
Funding cost as an 
annualized rate of 








T + 1.15 
(cap rate: 8.00) 




Funding cost as an 
annualized rate of 
preferred dividend *** 
29-Jun-13 29-Dec-37 Y 
Howa Bank Mar-14 16 
T + 0.95 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
1-Apr-14 1-Apr-29 N 
* Names of financial institutions in parenthesis refer to the entities that effectively received capital participation.  
** Preferred Shares with voting rights to appoint or dismiss directors.  
*** Rates or dividend rates applied for capital participation based on the special measures concerning the Great East Japan Earthquake are 
“funding cost as an annualized rate of preferred dividend” announced by the DICJ in each fiscal year, which is capped at 12-month JPY 
TIBOR or 8%, whichever is lower. 
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 Appendix B: Preferred investments 





After June 2011 
Amendment 
Shinkumi Federation Bank Dec-15 10.6 
T+0.32 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
Shinkumi Federation Bank Dec-16 6.24 
T+0.32 





Shinkumi Federation Bank Dec-17 10 
T+0.35 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
Shinkumi Federation Bank Mar-20 2 
T+0.38 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
Shinkumi Federation Bank Mar-20 7.2 
T+0.49 
(cap rate: 8.00) 
  

















Dec-11 20 Funding cost as an annualized rate of preferred dividend*  Y 
* Rates or dividend rates applied for capital participation based on the special measures concerning the Great East Japan 
Earthquake are “funding cost as annualized rate of preferred dividend” announced by DICJ in each fiscal year, which is capped 
at 12-month JPY TIBOR or 8%, whichever is lower. 
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Appendix D: Trust Beneficial Rights  
 Which 
ASFF? 
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(Nasu Shinkumi Bank)* 
Mar-12 5.4 
Funding 


































(Tokyo Kosei Shinkumi 
Bank)* 
Mar-14 5 


































































* Names of financial institutions in parenthesis refer to the entities that effectively received capital participation. 
** It is stipulated that within 10 years following capital participation, either (i) “authorization of management improvement” or 
(ii) “authorization of capital reorganization associated with business restructuring” must be obtained.  
*** Rates or dividend rates applied for capital participation based on the special measures concerning the Great East Japan 
Earthquake are “funding cost as annualized rate of preferred dividend” announced by DICJ in each fiscal year, which is capped at 
12-month JPY TIBOR or 8%, whichever is lower.  
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